Iranian crude exports on the public record: EIA, Vortexa, and IEA readings

Iranian oil export volumes are among the most disputed numbers in the market because sanctions, ship-to-ship transfers, and opaque pricing complicate measurement. The most reliable picture comes from named trackers as the U.S. Energy Information Administration and the International Energy Agency publish them, read together with the caveats those agencies attach. The EIA's 2026 Report on Iranian Petroleum and Petroleum Products Exports, prepared with Vortexa Analytics tanker-tracker estimates accessed in March 2026, reports crude oil and condensate exports from Iran at 1,445 thousand barrels per day in 2024 and 1,576 thousand barrels per day in 2025.

The same report's China-destination table shows Vortexa estimates of 1,384 thousand barrels per day to China in 2024 and 1,567 thousand barrels per day in 2025. Earlier EIA SHIP Act reporting for the 2025 edition, citing Vortexa accessed in March 2025, showed a similar China concentration pattern for 2024 with slightly different point estimates, underscoring that tanker-tracker series revise when re-accessed. Analysts should treat year-to-year comparisons within a single published table as more robust than mixing editions without noting the access date.

IEA Oil Market Report material adds monthly colour with the same caution. In the 12 February 2026 Oil Market Report PDF, the IEA assessed Iran's crude supply as remaining broadly stable at 3.45 million barrels per day in January despite widespread political unrest, while crude exports fell by 180 thousand barrels per day to 1.4 million barrels per day and inventories increased sharply. For market balances, Iranian barrels matter as a sanctioned but still material supply line into Chinese independent refining, and as a geopolitical risk factor when blockade or shadow-fleet enforcement tightens.

Hormuz geography still frames Iranian exports even when cargoes use opaque routing. Inventory behaviour inside Iran, when IEA notes stocks rising as exports fall, is a buffer, not proof of spare export capacity that can be monetised under tighter enforcement. Policy readers in importing capitals should therefore watch three public dashboards: EIA and IEA Iranian flow estimates, Chinese independent refinery run rates where published, and Hormuz transit series for the wider Gulf. Making energy planning add up requires separating Iranian sanctioned barrels from OPEC+ Gulf barrels that normally clear commercial markets.